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Agenda 
• Introduction 
• Overview of RPAS human factors 
• What can we learn from RPAS pilot incident 
reports? 
• Applying the lessons  
• Concluding thoughts 
 
Archibald Low’s radio-controlled aircraft, 1917 
Kettering Bug, 1918 Denny Radioplane, 1945 

Civilian Uses of RPAS 
• Advertising  
• Agriculture 
• Building inspections 
• Cattle herding 
• Construction site survey 
• Customs & border 
protection 
• Disaster response 
• Environmental sensing & 
research 
• Filmmaking 
• Firefighting 
• Journalism 
 
• Land surveying & mapping 
• Mineral exploration 
• Parcel delivery 
• Police 
• Powerline, pipeline, & rail 
track inspections 
• Real estate photography 
• Search & rescue 
• Ship inspections 
• Telecommunications relay 
• Traffic monitoring 
• Wildlife monitoring 
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Scope 
• RPA capable of flight in all classes of civil 
airspace 
• Instrument Flight Rules 
• Under the control of a pilot 
Accident Record 
• Army accident rate1,  
– Unmanned aircraft: 49 per 100,000 hours 
– Manned aircraft: 4 per 100,000 hours  
• USAF hull-loss rates in 20152:  
– MQ-9: 4 per 100,000 hours flown 
– Manned aircraft: 0.4 per 100,000 hours flown  
• Customs and Border Protection  
– MQ-9: 53 per 100,000 hours3 
– General aviation: accident rate 7 per 100,000 flight hours4 
• Small RPAS: ~ 300 per 100,000 flight hours 
 
1. Prather, 2013; 2. USAF, 2015; 3. Kalinowski & Allen, 2010; 4. NTSB 
Public Tolerance of Risk 
Involuntary 
exposure 
Unfamiliar 
• Radioactive waste 
• Commercial aviation 
• Skateboards 
• Lead paint 
• Pesticides 
Home swimming pools • 
• Water fluoridation 
• Automobile accidents 
• Smoking 
Nuclear weapons •  
Familiar 
Voluntary 
exposure 
• Genetically modified organisms 
After Paul Slovic, 2000 
Trampolines• 
• Hydraulic fracturing 
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Overview of RPAS Human Factors 
1. Loss of natural sensing 
2. Teleoperation via radio link  
3. Remote pilot station  
4. In-flight transfer of control 
5. Flight termination  
1. Loss of Natural Sensing 
• System and state awareness 
• May make error detection and recovery more 
difficult 
• Detect and avoid 
Detect and Avoid Display 
 
2. Teleoperation Via Radio Link 
2. Teleoperation Via Radio Link 
• Pilot can be located anywhere 
• Latencies & link outages = need for on-board 
automation 
• Pre-programmed lost link  
     maneuver 
 
 
3. Remote Pilot Station (RPS) 
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Laptop Pilot Station 
 
Physical Environment of the RPS 
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• Monotony 
• Discomfort 
• Accessibility 
• In-flight maintenance 
– Corrective vs preventative 
 Maintenance 
Corrective 
Fault 
isolation 
Remove & 
replace 
Repair 
Preventative 
Test & 
inspect 
Software 
updates 
Time 
replacement 
RPS Interfaces 
• Inadequate feedback to crew on system state 
• Multi-function controls  
• Difficult-to-read fonts and colors 
• Placement of critical controls next to non-
critical controls 
• Unreachable controls 
• Reliance on text displays 
• Proliferation of display screens 

4. In-flight Transfer of Control 
• Handovers at same console 
• Radio link changes 
• Transfers between consoles in same RPS 
• Transfers between RPS 
 
5. Flight Termination 
• Parachute deployment 
• Ditching 
• Off-airport landing 
• Aerodynamic flight termination 
• Controlled impact 
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RPAS Critical Incident Study: 
Rationale 
• “Tombstone safety” approach 
used in 20th century 
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Major accident 1 
Minor accidents 10 
Reportable incidents 30 
Minor events 600 
RPAS Critical Incident Study: 
Rationale 
• “Tombstone safety” approach 
used in 20th century 
• Lack of data on minor RPAS 
events 
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Critical Incident Technique 
• In 1940s, researchers asked pilots to recall pilot 
error incidents 
– Many “errors” reflected poor cockpit design 
– Results led to standardized cockpit design in modern 
aircraft 
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RPAS Critical Incident Study: Goals 
• Examine the feasibility of a method to collect the 
operational experiences of RPAS pilots  
• Provide independent and complementary data to 
supplement NASA simulations and flight tests  
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RPAS Critical Incident Study: Approach 
• Focus groups with 2-3 pilots at a time 
• Participants asked to recall events experienced 
while operating a remotely piloted aircraft 
1. A hazardous situation or error 
2. The rectification of a hazardous situation or error 
• Only reports that can be made public 
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Preliminary Results 
• 23 participants 
• 90 incidents described 
• Weight classes of the remotely piloted aircraft: 
 
 
Aircraft max takeoff weight     # of reports 
Less than 400 lbs       17 
2000-15,000 lbs        60 
Greater than 15,000 lbs      13 
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Problems Mentioned in Reports 
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Camera view illusion
Stale lost link mission
Weather
Lack of sensory information
Checklists
Data entry errors and slips
Maps and charts
ATC
Control transfer
Mode error/automation
Controls and displays
Link management and quality
Number of Mentions 
Example: Lost Link 
“We were flying really far out … about 90 kilometers 
from the antenna. But I passed some random mountain 
peak for about one second and the aircraft went into 
emergency mode. Luckily I had the correct emergency 
mode programmed. If I didn't, I could've lost the 
aircraft.” 
        
 
        
Example: Multiple Lost Link 
“One day the power company severed a power line. We 
lost link to all UASs … The uninterrupted power system 
(UPS) in the GCS has a maximum of 18 minutes of 
power available until the generators are up and running, 
but power ran out before the back-up generators were 
up and running.”      
        
  
        
Stages of Lost Link 
 
Example: Lost Link Timer 
“A pilot programmed “lost link okay” for a 3-hour period 
while the aircraft was loitering on satellite control. 
While he had the aircraft it actually went into lost link 
and it was still lost link when I came in to take over. I 
didn’t want to take an aircraft that I have no idea where 
it’s at or what it is doing. I did eventually take over the 
aircraft and another GCS, who had line-of-sight control, 
finally took over the aircraft.”  
 
        
Stale Lost Link 
• Pilot awareness of lost link mission 
• Lost link mission needs regular updating 
• Lost link mission can be a form of “automation 
surprise” 
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Example: Stale Lost Link 
“At the beginning of the flight, the lost link procedure 
was valid, but the procedure was not updated later in 
the flight. At one point, had the lost link procedure 
been activated, it would’ve had the aircraft fly through 
terrain in an attempt to reach the next waypoint. 
However, the aircraft didn’t lose link and the error was 
caught in the handover to the next set of operators.” 
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Example: Voice Latency 
“There is a delay between clicking the press-to-talk and 
talking. This is very difficult to manage when in very 
busy airspace, and listening for a gap to talk. 
Sometimes by the time we press the talk button, with 
the satellite delay, the gap is gone and we step on other 
aircraft.”  
 
Controls and Displays 
• Some RPS interfaces particularly error-
productive  
• Keyboard and consumer interfaces 
• Shared payload and flight controls 
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Example Narrative: Keyboards 
A QWERTY board is a problem because you can miss 
hit a button and input the wrong information. … one 
time an operator placed his manual on top of [the 
keyboard]. Accidently, this activated the GUI. Then 
more pressure was applied through handling the 
manual, on the space bar. As a result, it highlighted 
and armed, through several steps, the flight 
termination button. Luckily, the operator saw the 
countdown and caught it in time to deactivate this 
command.  
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Example: Mode Error during 
Control Station Transfer 
“During preflight, handover checks were being done … we 
had the aircraft engine at idle with the parking brake set, 
but when the radio handover switched to XXX, he didn’t 
have the parking brake set and the power was set at 80% 
….  The result was the engine revving up, and the aircraft 
jumping its chocks.”   
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Example: Unintended Transfer 
“I was preparing to take control of the aircraft from the 
MCE. The transmitters from my GCS were accidently 
left on. When I slewed the directional antenna to get 
the picture of the aircraft (the down link info), this 
automatically gave me control of the aircraft. I was not 
intending to take control of the aircraft at this time.” 
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Example: Data Entry Errors and Slips 
46 
“I went to put the gear down, but instead I 
turned the SAS  [Stability Augmentation 
System] off using the red emergency 
button. The aircraft went into a 20-degree 
bank and 5-degrees nose down. I was able 
to recover the airplane. I had developed 
muscle memory with the activation of the 
SAS disengagement button.”  
Example: Camera View Illusion 
“Depending on how I do the landing …. [the moveable 
sensor camera] …will be used to make sure that we 
clear the turns. But sometimes, the sensor operator 
will move the  camera, which will make it look like that 
I’m turning but I’m actually not turning. So I have to 
concentrate and make sure I don’t respond to that 
erroneous camera view.” 
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Example: Lack of Sensory Cues 
“We fly based on digital gauges. We don't hear 
or feel anything, like RPM changes …. The 
aircraft is supposed to level off, at say, 5,000', 
and there is a delay due to data link to know if it 
actually leveled off. … As opposed to a real 
aircraft [where] you can feel the airplane 
leveling off, I couldn't determine if it was still 
climbing until I noticed it was 300' past its 
command altitude.” 
 
 (4) Properties  
of the interface 
(3) Control requirements 
(2) Display requirements 
(1) Task descriptions 
System performance requirements 
(5) General 
human 
factors 
principles 
Applying the Lessons to RPS Guidelines 
Manage 
1. Aviate 
1.1 Monitor and control aircraft 
systems, including automation 
1.2 Monitor consumable 
resources 
1.3 Monitor and configure 
control station 
1.4 Maneuver to avoid collisions 
with other aircraft or terrain 
1.5 Monitor and control status 
of links 
1.6 Transfer control 
2. Navigate 
2.1 Control and monitor location 
and flight path of aircraft 
2.2 Remain clear of terrain, 
airspace boundaries and weather 
2.3 Remain well-clear of other 
aircraft 
2.4 Review and refresh lost link 
mission as necessary. 
2.5 Terminate flight 
3. Communicate 
3.1 Communicate with ATC 
3.2 Communicate with other 
airspace users 
3.3 Communicate with other 
flight crew or ground support 
3.4 Communicate with ancillary 
services (e.g. weather) 
Guidelines  
• 160 RPAS-specific guidelines 
• Examples: 
The aural warning for lost control link should be a 
unique sound, not also used to signify other conditions. 
The RPS should enable the pilot to set the duration of 
a link outage that must occur before a lost link 
response is triggered. 
Two distinct and dissimilar actions of the RPAS crew 
should be required to initiate the flight termination 
command.  
Payload controls should be separate from controls with 
safety-of-flight functions. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
• RPAS pilots are willing to share their 
experience  
• Incident reports are helping to identify under-
examined topics 
• Results are being used to inform design 
guidelines for RPAS control stations 
 
Unanswered Questions 
• What guidelines are needed for control station design? 
– Should there be an RPAS equivalent of the “Basic T” flight 
instruments?  
• Could one remote pilot manage multiple RPA?  
• What does ATC need to know about each RPA flight? 
• How much voice delay is too much?  
• Do remote pilots need experience flying a conventional 
aircraft?  
• What information is needed for flight termination decision 
making? 
• What RPS maintenance tasks should be permitted while an 
aircraft is in flight?  
• How do we make the best use of human capabilities? 
• Will conventional aircraft start to look more like RPAS? 
54 
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Questions? 
